In Defense of Irreligious Bioethcs, Part Two
Abram Brummett, PhD, HEC-C, Oakland University William Beaumont School of Medicine, Rochester, MI; Jason Eberl, PhD, Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO; and Matthew Shea, PhD, Franciscan University of Steubenville, Steubenville, OH
In 2012, Timothy Murphy published a target article in the American Journal of Bioethics titled “In Defense of Irreligious Bioethics.” The article generated a dozen (mostly critical) open peer commentaries and has been the subject of critique in many academic papers since. This talk aims to revive the fundamental thesis that religious arguments should be excluded from public bioethics with several important qualifications.
First, the phrase “religious arguments”, is better understood as “arguments that rely solely upon private premises.” As such, both typically “religious” (e.g., Christianity) and “non-religious” (e.g., Naturalism) arguments qualify for exclusion. Second, Murphy’s claim that public bioethics may “cannibalize” freely from the concepts and practices of various comprehensive doctrines is affirmed. Several examples of successful cannibalization (i.e., translation) of concepts from religious traditions will be provided. Third, knowledge of religious perspectives that may be offended by a point of public bioethics is important so that such offenses may be minimized where possible. At times, a point of public bioethics may be so unacceptable to so many affected persons due to their religious beliefs that it may be unwise to implement for practical reasons. Fourth, arguments in terms of private reason that support views already established in public bioethics should be encouraged and may even, at times, be essential for social change. For example, the use of religious arguments to further the ends of the Civil Rights Movement (a movement already well-supported by public reason) is an instance where religious perspectives should be welcomed in public bioethics.
A common objection is then considered, namely that all arguments rely upon premises that cannot be known with certainty, and therefore arguments that rely upon public reasons are no better than those that rely on private reasons. In response, we do not deny the claim that all arguments rely upon premises that cannot be known with certainty. Rather, we argue that certainty is an inappropriate epistemic standard and that what differentiates public from private premises is the accessibility of public premises.
Skepticism towards the notion of accessibility as a legitimate differentiating factor of public and private reasons is then considered. In response, we acknowledge that the precise boundary between public and private reasons can be difficult to draw but cite the sorites paradox to argue this is not a sufficient reason to abandon the distinction. Furthermore, abandoning the notion of accessibility would require abandoning all attempts at moral reasoning across persons with otherwise different comprehensive doctrines resulting in a dilemma between either a contentless libertarian framework for public bioethics or the dissolution of liberal democracy.
First, the phrase “religious arguments”, is better understood as “arguments that rely solely upon private premises.” As such, both typically “religious” (e.g., Christianity) and “non-religious” (e.g., Naturalism) arguments qualify for exclusion. Second, Murphy’s claim that public bioethics may “cannibalize” freely from the concepts and practices of various comprehensive doctrines is affirmed. Several examples of successful cannibalization (i.e., translation) of concepts from religious traditions will be provided. Third, knowledge of religious perspectives that may be offended by a point of public bioethics is important so that such offenses may be minimized where possible. At times, a point of public bioethics may be so unacceptable to so many affected persons due to their religious beliefs that it may be unwise to implement for practical reasons. Fourth, arguments in terms of private reason that support views already established in public bioethics should be encouraged and may even, at times, be essential for social change. For example, the use of religious arguments to further the ends of the Civil Rights Movement (a movement already well-supported by public reason) is an instance where religious perspectives should be welcomed in public bioethics.
A common objection is then considered, namely that all arguments rely upon premises that cannot be known with certainty, and therefore arguments that rely upon public reasons are no better than those that rely on private reasons. In response, we do not deny the claim that all arguments rely upon premises that cannot be known with certainty. Rather, we argue that certainty is an inappropriate epistemic standard and that what differentiates public from private premises is the accessibility of public premises.
Skepticism towards the notion of accessibility as a legitimate differentiating factor of public and private reasons is then considered. In response, we acknowledge that the precise boundary between public and private reasons can be difficult to draw but cite the sorites paradox to argue this is not a sufficient reason to abandon the distinction. Furthermore, abandoning the notion of accessibility would require abandoning all attempts at moral reasoning across persons with otherwise different comprehensive doctrines resulting in a dilemma between either a contentless libertarian framework for public bioethics or the dissolution of liberal democracy.