Imminent Personhood and Abortion
Joel Cox, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO

Few debates conjure the angst, emotion, and conviction of the debate surrounding abortion and for good reason. The debate brings to the forefront multiple competing goods including autonomy and respect for life, while affecting individual lives, the law, and politics in complex ways. Within the discussion, one of the preeminent issues is the status of the fetus: Is the fetus an actualized person or merely a potential person? The answer to this question often seems to determine what side one will come out on in the debate about the ethics of abortion. While this point appears to lie at the heart of the conversation, it is based on a misguided view about the nature of the fetus. In this paper, I will attempt to clarify the status of the fetus to hopefully resituate this debate in a more helpful place. I am arguing that a fetus is an imminent person rather than a potential person, and that imminent entities have a special moral standing that goes beyond that of potential entities. To make this argument, I will first provide background on different views about the metaphysical and moral status of fetuses to give context for the view I espouse. Then, I will define and argue for the concept of imminence before responding to objections. These objections will include arguments concerning whether imminence is a stage of existence, whether the fetus can be both an imminent and potential person, and whether the personhood of the fetus matters to the debate around abortion.