Human Nature as Given, or Human Nature as Gift?
Nicholas Sparks, PhD (c), St. Louis University
Bioconservatives and transhumanists fundamentally differ in their assessments of the desirability of, and our capacity for, the technological enhancement and alteration of humans. My aim in this paper is to focus on the metaphysics necessary to successfully articulate an objection to transhumanism rooted in an account of human nature or human dignity, articulated by Leon Kass and other bioethicists.
I aim to argue that purely naturalistic accounts of human nature necessarily fail as bulwarks against the transhumanist project of human enhancement. This is because there is a significant difference between some thing’s being ‘given’ and some thing’s being ‘gift.’ A gift qua gift necessarily possesses intelligibility and normativity; whereas something given, qua given, does not (at least, not necessarily). A gift requires a proportionate response of gratitude; what is merely ‘given’ need not.
It is easiest to show the inadequacy of an ontology of the given in the case of evolutionary accounts of human nature, since evolutionary naturalists tend to straightforwardly deny any normative content to human nature as such. Since in this context, ‘human nature’ simply refers to the bundle of distinctive characteristics arrived at as the result of the process of evolutionary development, ‘human nature’ may be intelligible, though it is not necessarily normative in ethical questions (and to the extent that it is normative, it is defeasible).
One might think we can find a stronger defense in the neo-Aristotelian naturalism of Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson. Yet I will argue that this is not so, for two reasons. First, neo-Aristotelian naturalism fails to validate the goodness of being human, though it gives us a framework for thinking about human excellence in terms internal to the human life-form. And second, it fails to acknowledge our creatureliness. Thus, neo-Aristotelian natural normativity fails to provide the framework for an all-things-considered endorsement of the normativity of human nature. But this is what is necessary to resist the ontology of power embodied in the transhumanist project of radical enhancement.
My proposal is this: since transhumanism embodies an ontology of power, to resist its lures and claims we need to articulate an ethic rooted in an ontology of gift. Drawing on the work of John Milbank and David L. Schindler, I point the way toward an account of human nature, and a bioethical framework, rooted in a participatory metaphysics of gift. In the end, we will have to appeal to the resources of the theology of gift and creation to understand and situate the natural integrity and goodness of human nature. This leads us to an ethics centered around gratitude, reciprocity, and trust, rather than the transhumanist ethic of control, power, and ordering.
I aim to argue that purely naturalistic accounts of human nature necessarily fail as bulwarks against the transhumanist project of human enhancement. This is because there is a significant difference between some thing’s being ‘given’ and some thing’s being ‘gift.’ A gift qua gift necessarily possesses intelligibility and normativity; whereas something given, qua given, does not (at least, not necessarily). A gift requires a proportionate response of gratitude; what is merely ‘given’ need not.
It is easiest to show the inadequacy of an ontology of the given in the case of evolutionary accounts of human nature, since evolutionary naturalists tend to straightforwardly deny any normative content to human nature as such. Since in this context, ‘human nature’ simply refers to the bundle of distinctive characteristics arrived at as the result of the process of evolutionary development, ‘human nature’ may be intelligible, though it is not necessarily normative in ethical questions (and to the extent that it is normative, it is defeasible).
One might think we can find a stronger defense in the neo-Aristotelian naturalism of Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson. Yet I will argue that this is not so, for two reasons. First, neo-Aristotelian naturalism fails to validate the goodness of being human, though it gives us a framework for thinking about human excellence in terms internal to the human life-form. And second, it fails to acknowledge our creatureliness. Thus, neo-Aristotelian natural normativity fails to provide the framework for an all-things-considered endorsement of the normativity of human nature. But this is what is necessary to resist the ontology of power embodied in the transhumanist project of radical enhancement.
My proposal is this: since transhumanism embodies an ontology of power, to resist its lures and claims we need to articulate an ethic rooted in an ontology of gift. Drawing on the work of John Milbank and David L. Schindler, I point the way toward an account of human nature, and a bioethical framework, rooted in a participatory metaphysics of gift. In the end, we will have to appeal to the resources of the theology of gift and creation to understand and situate the natural integrity and goodness of human nature. This leads us to an ethics centered around gratitude, reciprocity, and trust, rather than the transhumanist ethic of control, power, and ordering.