Hinduism as a Source of Bioethics
John Lunstroth, JD. LLM, MPH, Fellow, UNESCO Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights
There are two main ways religions can inform scientific medicine (“medicine”): i) as a source for a theory of the human (of life, meaning) and ii) as a source of norms for regulating medicine (bioethics). Since medicine is based on a materialist metaphysics it cannot guide religion in the same fundamental way religion can guide, or contribute to, medicine. I am going to focus on the sacred books of India as a source of norms for regulating medicine.
The canonical texts of India describe several ways to categorize human existence. There are four stages (chaturashramas) that are loosely age based: brahmacharya (student), grihastha (householder), vanaprastha (retired) and sannyasa (renunciation). There are four goals of the human life (puruṣartha): artha (socio-economic position); kama (fulfilling desired); dharma (being virtuous); and moksha (liberation). There are four classes (varṇas) of human beings: brahmins (priests); kshatriyas (rulers); vaishyas (merchants); and shudras (laborers).
These classifications are embedded in a variety of abstract systems that largely share and are governed by certain norms that apply to and control all of the classifications. Concepts include dharma, karma, samsara, guru, atman, and brahman. A central tenet is that direct knowledge (samadhi) of these abstract concepts is possible through sadhana (meditation).
Traditions based on the foregoing concepts came to be known as the religion “Hinduism” in the 19th century. Conceiving of the great cluster of traditions as a single religion results in a temptation to think that the concepts identified above exist in a uniform conceptual space governed by one God, like Christianity or Islam. The idea of one God as the lawgiver and organizer of reality does not map onto Hinduism and bioethicists who fall into the temptation of thinking that Hinduism exists then make normative analyses based on material misunderstandings of the concepts.
What gets lost in the inappropriate mapping is that each of the categories identified above have a kind of reality and concreteness that is impossible to conceive within the framework of a uniform conceptual space. Each of them is its own conceptual space, each has its own laws (dharma), especially regarding decision making, or ethics. The Indian traditions are profoundly pluralistic and syncretistic.
Although there is order and hierarchy among the concepts and categories, that order is not familiar to the idea of religion. To illustrate with regards to bioethics, I focus on the difference between life as a householder (grihastha) and life as a renunciate (sannyasa). These are two centers of gravity, each with its own dharma. The renunciate lives apart from society at large, and is directly familiar with the abstract concepts that order existence. The householder is embedded in the political/economic order, and is not expected to have direct knowledge of the abstract concepts. I argue bioethics as such is proper for the householder, but not the renunciate, and that the abstract concepts (i.e., karma, atman, etc.) are inapt in bioethical analyses.
There are two main ways religions can inform scientific medicine (“medicine”): i) as a source for a theory of the human (of life, meaning) and ii) as a source of norms for regulating medicine (bioethics). Since medicine is based on a materialist metaphysics it cannot guide religion in the same fundamental way religion can guide, or contribute to, medicine. I am going to focus on the sacred books of India as a source of norms for regulating medicine.
The canonical texts of India describe several ways to categorize human existence. There are four stages (chaturashramas) that are loosely age based: brahmacharya (student), grihastha (householder), vanaprastha (retired) and sannyasa (renunciation). There are four goals of the human life (puruṣartha): artha (socio-economic position); kama (fulfilling desired); dharma (being virtuous); and moksha (liberation). There are four classes (varṇas) of human beings: brahmins (priests); kshatriyas (rulers); vaishyas (merchants); and shudras (laborers).
These classifications are embedded in a variety of abstract systems that largely share and are governed by certain norms that apply to and control all of the classifications. Concepts include dharma, karma, samsara, guru, atman, and brahman. A central tenet is that direct knowledge (samadhi) of these abstract concepts is possible through sadhana (meditation).
Traditions based on the foregoing concepts came to be known as the religion “Hinduism” in the 19th century. Conceiving of the great cluster of traditions as a single religion results in a temptation to think that the concepts identified above exist in a uniform conceptual space governed by one God, like Christianity or Islam. The idea of one God as the lawgiver and organizer of reality does not map onto Hinduism and bioethicists who fall into the temptation of thinking that Hinduism exists then make normative analyses based on material misunderstandings of the concepts.
What gets lost in the inappropriate mapping is that each of the categories identified above have a kind of reality and concreteness that is impossible to conceive within the framework of a uniform conceptual space. Each of them is its own conceptual space, each has its own laws (dharma), especially regarding decision making, or ethics. The Indian traditions are profoundly pluralistic and syncretistic.
Although there is order and hierarchy among the concepts and categories, that order is not familiar to the idea of religion. To illustrate with regards to bioethics, I focus on the difference between life as a householder (grihastha) and life as a renunciate (sannyasa). These are two centers of gravity, each with its own dharma. The renunciate lives apart from society at large, and is directly familiar with the abstract concepts that order existence. The householder is embedded in the political/economic order, and is not expected to have direct knowledge of the abstract concepts. I argue bioethics as such is proper for the householder, but not the renunciate, and that the abstract concepts (i.e., karma, atman, etc.) are inapt in bioethical analyses.