Enchantment of Perception in Conformity with Aristotle
Joseph Magee, PhD., Director of Catholic Campus Ministry for the Texas Medical Center, Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston
The disenchantment of modern cultures which Max Weber attributes to the progress of materialist and reductionist accounts of nature, especially of human nature, has led to banishment of old gods as more and more problems fall to scientific analysis. In its wake, there has been a loss of the sense intrinsic value and meaning in human endeavors, notably of the scientific enterprise itself. Ever since the perceived failure of Cartesian dualism, this process of disenchantment has been carried out in the philosophy of mind as the continuing quest to offer a reductionist, materialist account of conscious cognitive states, especially perceptual states, as they are most clearly dependent on the physical state of sense organs.
Instead of seeking to explain mental states as mere properties of the material constitution of an organism (i.e., brains and nervous system of higher animals), the most popular theories in the philosophy of mind focus on the functions which mental states perform in the life of an organism, and on the organization of the matter which allows the mental states to play this functional role. Theorists have seen in this approach an affinity to the central place Aristotle gives to form over matter, and to his defining capacities in terms of their functional realization. While certainly similarities exist between contemporary theories of mind and Aristotle’s views on perception, the contemporary theories are fundamentally at odds with Aristotle’s understanding of perception. Aristotle’s insights into the actual nature of perceptual activity are nevertheless valuable precisely for illuminating these limitations of current theories, and for suggesting ways of overcoming some difficulties.
Specifically, Aristotle makes a distinction between immanent activity (energeia), an activity uniquely characteristic of cognitive states, and transient alteration (alloiosis), the processes which are the objects of a purely physical investigation This distinction allows him to elucidate an account of two features of conscious states which has so far been recalcitrant in their resistance to materialist reduction: intentionality and the subjective qualitative “feel,” i.e., the qualia, of perceptual states. Precisely as a kind of activity distinct from material alteration wherein a substance takes on the qualities of what affects it in becoming like it, Aristotle’s elaboration on the nature of energeia gives insight into cognitive identity in terms of a conformity to its object. Reclaiming the non-reductionist features of Aristotle’s energeia thereby conceptually safeguards intentionality. It also provides a framework in which to situate the subjective qualia which are essential and ineliminable from perceptual experience.
Despite the illumination Aristotle’s insights give, there is however left dangling the precise relation between physical alteration and the perceptual activity. For while the latter cannot be reduced to the former, physical alterations nevertheless can impede them and so are necessary for perceptual activity. Notwithstanding this avenue in need of further exploration, the fundamental enchanted features of intentionality and subjectivity within perceptual states cannot be banished from our understanding of cognition. Instead, these fruitfully can be explored in illuminating ways through Aristotle’s immanent activity.
The disenchantment of modern cultures which Max Weber attributes to the progress of materialist and reductionist accounts of nature, especially of human nature, has led to banishment of old gods as more and more problems fall to scientific analysis. In its wake, there has been a loss of the sense intrinsic value and meaning in human endeavors, notably of the scientific enterprise itself. Ever since the perceived failure of Cartesian dualism, this process of disenchantment has been carried out in the philosophy of mind as the continuing quest to offer a reductionist, materialist account of conscious cognitive states, especially perceptual states, as they are most clearly dependent on the physical state of sense organs.
Instead of seeking to explain mental states as mere properties of the material constitution of an organism (i.e., brains and nervous system of higher animals), the most popular theories in the philosophy of mind focus on the functions which mental states perform in the life of an organism, and on the organization of the matter which allows the mental states to play this functional role. Theorists have seen in this approach an affinity to the central place Aristotle gives to form over matter, and to his defining capacities in terms of their functional realization. While certainly similarities exist between contemporary theories of mind and Aristotle’s views on perception, the contemporary theories are fundamentally at odds with Aristotle’s understanding of perception. Aristotle’s insights into the actual nature of perceptual activity are nevertheless valuable precisely for illuminating these limitations of current theories, and for suggesting ways of overcoming some difficulties.
Specifically, Aristotle makes a distinction between immanent activity (energeia), an activity uniquely characteristic of cognitive states, and transient alteration (alloiosis), the processes which are the objects of a purely physical investigation This distinction allows him to elucidate an account of two features of conscious states which has so far been recalcitrant in their resistance to materialist reduction: intentionality and the subjective qualitative “feel,” i.e., the qualia, of perceptual states. Precisely as a kind of activity distinct from material alteration wherein a substance takes on the qualities of what affects it in becoming like it, Aristotle’s elaboration on the nature of energeia gives insight into cognitive identity in terms of a conformity to its object. Reclaiming the non-reductionist features of Aristotle’s energeia thereby conceptually safeguards intentionality. It also provides a framework in which to situate the subjective qualia which are essential and ineliminable from perceptual experience.
Despite the illumination Aristotle’s insights give, there is however left dangling the precise relation between physical alteration and the perceptual activity. For while the latter cannot be reduced to the former, physical alterations nevertheless can impede them and so are necessary for perceptual activity. Notwithstanding this avenue in need of further exploration, the fundamental enchanted features of intentionality and subjectivity within perceptual states cannot be banished from our understanding of cognition. Instead, these fruitfully can be explored in illuminating ways through Aristotle’s immanent activity.