Definitions of Death: An Evaluative Method and Implications for Approaches to Religious Legal Sources
Noam Stadlan, MD, NorthShore University Healthcare system
Bernat and others have described three aspects of a definition of death: a concept of what is the essence of human life- and in its absence- death; criteria that identify the biological state correlating to the absence of that essence; and tests to identify those who are in that biological state- and are therefore dead. A definition of death can be examined for internal validity- how accurately each level fulfills the function mandated. For example, are all who fulfill a specific battery of tests actually in the biological state mandated by the criteria? Religious law can specify one, two or all three aspects of the definition. But unless logic and scientific understanding have been used to derive the levels from each other, the definition will almost certainly lack some internal validity.
Aside from a specific definition of death, religious law frequently identifies certain collections of human tissue as alive or dead. For example, most religions identify dicephalic twins (two heads each with a functioning brain but only one body) as two human beings. How a definition of death correctly predicts the religiously mandated life and death status in these situations can be termed external validity.
Religious law also can specify how to determine personal identity. If the criteria for personal identity are not the same as for life and death, then the potential exists for two novel categories of functioning human tissue: There can be tissue that fulfills the requirements to be a particular person, but does not qualify as a human life; and tissue that is identified as an alive human being but does not have a personal identity. These outcomes can also be seen as poor validity unless the religious legal structure is capable of providing guidance in these instances.
When this analysis is applied to current suggestions for the definition of death, the neurologically based definitions (‘brain death’) exhibit much greater validity than those based on integrated function.
Adherents of the Abrahamic faiths depend on premodern sources to provide the basis for the definition of death. The sources frequently do not specifically address the realities of modern medicine: artificial and transplanted organs, circulation pumps, ventilators, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and hypothermic cardiac arrest. The sources can be understood literally or conceptually, and either in the context of the science of the time, or current scientific understanding can be ahistorically imposed on them.
Using Jewish law(halacha) as a example(with some illustrations from Catholic and Islamic law ), this paper will illustrate how ignoring the historical scientific context and taking a literal approach to the sources results in a lack of internal and external validity, as well as problems with personal identity. These ramifications do not appear to have been outlined previously in detail or in a systematic fashion. The paper will also discuss the options available to the believer faced with these inconsistencies.
Bernat and others have described three aspects of a definition of death: a concept of what is the essence of human life- and in its absence- death; criteria that identify the biological state correlating to the absence of that essence; and tests to identify those who are in that biological state- and are therefore dead. A definition of death can be examined for internal validity- how accurately each level fulfills the function mandated. For example, are all who fulfill a specific battery of tests actually in the biological state mandated by the criteria? Religious law can specify one, two or all three aspects of the definition. But unless logic and scientific understanding have been used to derive the levels from each other, the definition will almost certainly lack some internal validity.
Aside from a specific definition of death, religious law frequently identifies certain collections of human tissue as alive or dead. For example, most religions identify dicephalic twins (two heads each with a functioning brain but only one body) as two human beings. How a definition of death correctly predicts the religiously mandated life and death status in these situations can be termed external validity.
Religious law also can specify how to determine personal identity. If the criteria for personal identity are not the same as for life and death, then the potential exists for two novel categories of functioning human tissue: There can be tissue that fulfills the requirements to be a particular person, but does not qualify as a human life; and tissue that is identified as an alive human being but does not have a personal identity. These outcomes can also be seen as poor validity unless the religious legal structure is capable of providing guidance in these instances.
When this analysis is applied to current suggestions for the definition of death, the neurologically based definitions (‘brain death’) exhibit much greater validity than those based on integrated function.
Adherents of the Abrahamic faiths depend on premodern sources to provide the basis for the definition of death. The sources frequently do not specifically address the realities of modern medicine: artificial and transplanted organs, circulation pumps, ventilators, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and hypothermic cardiac arrest. The sources can be understood literally or conceptually, and either in the context of the science of the time, or current scientific understanding can be ahistorically imposed on them.
Using Jewish law(halacha) as a example(with some illustrations from Catholic and Islamic law ), this paper will illustrate how ignoring the historical scientific context and taking a literal approach to the sources results in a lack of internal and external validity, as well as problems with personal identity. These ramifications do not appear to have been outlined previously in detail or in a systematic fashion. The paper will also discuss the options available to the believer faced with these inconsistencies.