Can a Kidney Be Given?: Theology of Gift and Organ Donation
Ysabel Vandenberg, St. Louis University
Organ donation is often described as a gift of life. The decedent gives part(s) of their body in order to save other lives, or vastly improve them. Ethically, it seems important that organs are gifted rather than bought or otherwise exchanged. However, despite an expanding body of philosophical and theological work on gift, there is little analysis of the ‘gift’ of an organ. This presentation, part of a larger project on the ethics and theology of organ donation, will bring the phenomenon of procuring organs from deceased donors into conversation with John Milbank’s theology of gift giving.
At first glance, organ donation seems to be the most probable instance of Derrida’s ‘pure’ or ‘free’ gift where nothing is expected in return. The donor is dead – how could they possibly expect something in return or gain from the experience? Milbank rejects Derrida’s analysis of pure gift, contending that givers of gifts need not be disinterested or “suicidally sacrificial”. Similarly, a gift is not ruined by an impure motivation, but depends on the suitability of the thing given. For Milbank, a gift is characterized by non-identical repetition and delay from the original gift. He embraces the notion that exchange and relationship-building is an integral aspect of gifting.
Does organ donation pose a problem for Milbank’s account of gift? Not necessarily. In their willingness to give body parts for the lives of others, the donor receives an opportunity to relate to Christ’s giving of his body. Furthermore, when we conceptualize the decedent and their loved ones as gift-givers (this is argued for in another part of the project), we see that they may also receive goods in the process. They may receive assurance that others can be benefitted amid grief. Though the gift-givers usually do not meet the receivers of the organs or receive anything directly from them in the future, they can be situated in a grander theological scheme of giving which is not limited to two individuals or entities. We begin with the precondition of receiving our bodies as gifts from God and humanity, and with our bodies we can give gifts. Organ donation captures this theological idea in a literal sense.
At first glance, organ donation seems to be the most probable instance of Derrida’s ‘pure’ or ‘free’ gift where nothing is expected in return. The donor is dead – how could they possibly expect something in return or gain from the experience? Milbank rejects Derrida’s analysis of pure gift, contending that givers of gifts need not be disinterested or “suicidally sacrificial”. Similarly, a gift is not ruined by an impure motivation, but depends on the suitability of the thing given. For Milbank, a gift is characterized by non-identical repetition and delay from the original gift. He embraces the notion that exchange and relationship-building is an integral aspect of gifting.
Does organ donation pose a problem for Milbank’s account of gift? Not necessarily. In their willingness to give body parts for the lives of others, the donor receives an opportunity to relate to Christ’s giving of his body. Furthermore, when we conceptualize the decedent and their loved ones as gift-givers (this is argued for in another part of the project), we see that they may also receive goods in the process. They may receive assurance that others can be benefitted amid grief. Though the gift-givers usually do not meet the receivers of the organs or receive anything directly from them in the future, they can be situated in a grander theological scheme of giving which is not limited to two individuals or entities. We begin with the precondition of receiving our bodies as gifts from God and humanity, and with our bodies we can give gifts. Organ donation captures this theological idea in a literal sense.