A Hylomorphic Theory of Disease
Andre Chavez, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO
This paper builds on Daniel Sulmasy’s teleological account of disease, first presented in his 2010 paper, “Diseases and Natural Kinds.” According to Sulmasy, “One cannot understand human disease unless one understands that human beings are a natural kind. This is not to argue that diseases are natural kinds, but that the concept of a disease must make necessary reference to a natural kind” (Sulmasy, 2010, 491). In his view, humans are members of a natural kind that is characterized by dispositional predicates, including internal biological relations, that determine what it means to flourish as a member of that kind. Some commentators have opposed Sulmasy’s view by arguing against his claim that diseases are not natural kinds themselves: “Diseases are not primary existents. […] Diseases are not natural kinds, but states of affairs. Diseases have no essences” (Sulmasy, 2010, 502). For instance, Stefan Dragulinescu has argued that diseases should be treated as natural kinds because they behave in the same law-like patterns as other natural entities that are uncontroversially called natural kinds, such as scientific elements.
In this paper, I hope to build on Sulmasy’s position by defending the claim that diseases are not natural kinds but merely predicates of them. I draw from Jeffrey Brower’s Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle’s substratum theory to argue that diseases are accidental forms predicated of human substances. Specifically, disease concepts are accidental forms, and particular diseases are accidental unities of form and matter (the matter being a whole human substance). Understanding diseases as accidental unities explains why they are predicates of natural kinds and not natural kinds themselves. To argue this, I will first draw from Brower to argue that diseases are hylomorphic composites consisting of an accidental form predicated of a human person. Brower’s account explains why human persons are the more ontologically significant category and diseases are more arbitrary, contingent categories. Then, I will consider two objections regarding the “problem of the many” and the “problem of temporary intrinsics.” Finally, I will examine a few consequences of my account that should make it attractive to non-hylomorphists.
In this paper, I hope to build on Sulmasy’s position by defending the claim that diseases are not natural kinds but merely predicates of them. I draw from Jeffrey Brower’s Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle’s substratum theory to argue that diseases are accidental forms predicated of human substances. Specifically, disease concepts are accidental forms, and particular diseases are accidental unities of form and matter (the matter being a whole human substance). Understanding diseases as accidental unities explains why they are predicates of natural kinds and not natural kinds themselves. To argue this, I will first draw from Brower to argue that diseases are hylomorphic composites consisting of an accidental form predicated of a human person. Brower’s account explains why human persons are the more ontologically significant category and diseases are more arbitrary, contingent categories. Then, I will consider two objections regarding the “problem of the many” and the “problem of temporary intrinsics.” Finally, I will examine a few consequences of my account that should make it attractive to non-hylomorphists.