Jan Patočka on Myth: Observations on the Foundations of Religious Belief and Medical Decision Making
Trevor Bible, Ph.D., MTS, Assistant Professor of Medicine, Baylor College of Medicine
Scholars of religion and medicine continue to examine the ways religious beliefs function when the sick and their loved-ones make medical decisions. The Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka (1907-77) is a fruitful, but neglected, resource for this ongoing project. In this presentation, I make a series of observations connecting Patočka’s notion of myth with medical decision-making. I intend to show how these connections lead to a better understanding of the processes many faithful use as they reason-through medical decisions.
For Patočka, myth influences our lives at both the individual and communal levels. Mythic beliefs are not fantastical stories that gullible bearded men in togas in times long-past believed. Myths are stories and beliefs about the world that guardians impart to their children. Questions of whether such myths are ultimately true or false are inessential for Patočka. Instead, it is the subjective acceptance of mythic belief that he addresses in Plato and Europe (2002). When children ask “Why?” adults respond with explanations, often based in narratives. These guardians are authoritative sources on issues of everyday and ultimate importance. Therefore, distinct myths take shape in each child’s mind. Such myths: teach children how to act, understand social interactions, and find meaning.
According to Patočka, myth functions similarly for humans throughout history, independent of culture and time, even if the myths we absorb are distinct. Each may be raised with familial traditions borne of a shared history; nonetheless, we are born into different families, communities, and cultures, making our individual myths unique. As we grow, we encounter the world and begin employing our learned myths to interpret what we encounter. We appeal to the past, to history, to tradition—to our learned myths. For many, these accounts influence, and often determine, religious beliefs throughout adulthood.
Patočka’s observations on myth assist scholars and clinicians in understanding religious belief in a number of ways. I will highlight two. First, Patočka’s thought reaffirms that religious beliefs do not necessarily function as mere coping mechanisms. Whether personal experience or as a witness to the sickness of another, mythic beliefs may supply a decision-maker with a readily-available and sturdy worldview that can account for sickness. Belief has more to do with application than reaction. Second, this conception of myth illustrates why so many of the faithful hold steadfastly to their religious beliefs, especially when sickness and death arise. To wit, myth provides these believers with a solid foundation from which to view their respective senses of self, proper action, and community. To question such myths would be to question one’s idea of oneself and one’s world.
I end the presentation with a few prompting questions. What is Patočka’s account of mythic belief missing? Is there a morally significant difference between those who accept their childhood myth and those who eventually reject such accounts?
Scholars of religion and medicine continue to examine the ways religious beliefs function when the sick and their loved-ones make medical decisions. The Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka (1907-77) is a fruitful, but neglected, resource for this ongoing project. In this presentation, I make a series of observations connecting Patočka’s notion of myth with medical decision-making. I intend to show how these connections lead to a better understanding of the processes many faithful use as they reason-through medical decisions.
For Patočka, myth influences our lives at both the individual and communal levels. Mythic beliefs are not fantastical stories that gullible bearded men in togas in times long-past believed. Myths are stories and beliefs about the world that guardians impart to their children. Questions of whether such myths are ultimately true or false are inessential for Patočka. Instead, it is the subjective acceptance of mythic belief that he addresses in Plato and Europe (2002). When children ask “Why?” adults respond with explanations, often based in narratives. These guardians are authoritative sources on issues of everyday and ultimate importance. Therefore, distinct myths take shape in each child’s mind. Such myths: teach children how to act, understand social interactions, and find meaning.
According to Patočka, myth functions similarly for humans throughout history, independent of culture and time, even if the myths we absorb are distinct. Each may be raised with familial traditions borne of a shared history; nonetheless, we are born into different families, communities, and cultures, making our individual myths unique. As we grow, we encounter the world and begin employing our learned myths to interpret what we encounter. We appeal to the past, to history, to tradition—to our learned myths. For many, these accounts influence, and often determine, religious beliefs throughout adulthood.
Patočka’s observations on myth assist scholars and clinicians in understanding religious belief in a number of ways. I will highlight two. First, Patočka’s thought reaffirms that religious beliefs do not necessarily function as mere coping mechanisms. Whether personal experience or as a witness to the sickness of another, mythic beliefs may supply a decision-maker with a readily-available and sturdy worldview that can account for sickness. Belief has more to do with application than reaction. Second, this conception of myth illustrates why so many of the faithful hold steadfastly to their religious beliefs, especially when sickness and death arise. To wit, myth provides these believers with a solid foundation from which to view their respective senses of self, proper action, and community. To question such myths would be to question one’s idea of oneself and one’s world.
I end the presentation with a few prompting questions. What is Patočka’s account of mythic belief missing? Is there a morally significant difference between those who accept their childhood myth and those who eventually reject such accounts?