Embodiment as Saturated Phenomenon: Medicine, Theology, and Some Metaphysical Premises of Modernity
Robert Dell’Oro, ThD, Loyola Marymount University
The difficulty in articulation a theological contribution to medicine, at least from a Christian perspective, rests upon basic premises concerning the meaning of embodiment. Such premises, such as those pertaining to the notion of the “body as constructed,” remain mostly recessive in contemporary bioethical debate and, even more, in the practice of medicine; yet precisely as such, they prevent a full articulation of central theological insights, for an example, the nature of the body as a gift, the person as a “unified totality,” and the inter-subjective quality of the body as a medium of relationality.
In the paper, I address, first, some of the philosophical roots of the difficulty at hand; second, I plead for the analogy of faith and reason to support a correlation between philosophical and theological reflection about embodiment; and, third, propose an alternative model of embodiment.
In particular, I argue that “the separated body” model -- a legacy of the Cartesian antagonism of body and soul as opposite substances, and influencing much of modern medicine – feeds on a methodical suspicion and, consequently, a de-valuation of being as such. How does being healthy or sick depend upon broader conceptualizations of what does it mean to be? How do metaphysical assumptions condition our own understanding of the goal of medicine, the meaning of embodiment, and their possible intermediation with a theological discourse on the body?
Relying upon insights from the phenomenological tradition, I offer an account of embodiment as “saturated phenomenon,” that is, as a symbol of our being given to be as a condition of the act of medicine.
The difficulty in articulation a theological contribution to medicine, at least from a Christian perspective, rests upon basic premises concerning the meaning of embodiment. Such premises, such as those pertaining to the notion of the “body as constructed,” remain mostly recessive in contemporary bioethical debate and, even more, in the practice of medicine; yet precisely as such, they prevent a full articulation of central theological insights, for an example, the nature of the body as a gift, the person as a “unified totality,” and the inter-subjective quality of the body as a medium of relationality.
In the paper, I address, first, some of the philosophical roots of the difficulty at hand; second, I plead for the analogy of faith and reason to support a correlation between philosophical and theological reflection about embodiment; and, third, propose an alternative model of embodiment.
In particular, I argue that “the separated body” model -- a legacy of the Cartesian antagonism of body and soul as opposite substances, and influencing much of modern medicine – feeds on a methodical suspicion and, consequently, a de-valuation of being as such. How does being healthy or sick depend upon broader conceptualizations of what does it mean to be? How do metaphysical assumptions condition our own understanding of the goal of medicine, the meaning of embodiment, and their possible intermediation with a theological discourse on the body?
Relying upon insights from the phenomenological tradition, I offer an account of embodiment as “saturated phenomenon,” that is, as a symbol of our being given to be as a condition of the act of medicine.
